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Introduction
American Indians have always had a tenuous relationship within the
governmental structure of the United States. Are Indian tribes to be treated as
states? Are they to be treated as foreign nations? Are they somewhere in
between? This structural dilemma remains uncomfortably prominent in federal-
state-tribal relations.
Perhaps most perplexing is the question of what role American judicial
systems can play within the sphere of tribal government. Students of the law
spend countless hours studying the relationships between state courts and
federal courts, state law and federal law. With any luck, and perhaps a little
effort, they become somewhat conversant in the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
Rarely, however, do students become as conversant in tribal immunity case
law. It is a complex issue, made so in part by the ever-changing status of
Indian tribes within American society. Yet the underlying principles supporting
tribal immunity are generally the same as those supporting state immunity:
* Legal Assistant, Iowa District Court for the Third Judicial District; J.D. Law, Drake
University (1998); M.A. Political Science, Iowa State University (1998).
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tribes need to be protected from bankrupting suits and from the distraction to
government operations such suits may cause.' The issue is perhaps even more
important for Indian tribes, considering their limited financial and legal
resources 2
This article examines the evolution of tribal immunity and highlights the
major cases establishing an immunity that parallels the states' protection under
the Eleventh Amendment. Part II discusses the origins of sovereign immunity
and the justifications for providing states some protection from suit. It will
provide a very basic outline of the immunity protections offered to the states
and the federal government, and then consider why tribes should have similar
immunity protections.
Part III provides an overview of the historical and constitutional status of
Indian tribes within American government and society. The complexities in
understanding tribal immunity comes from the fact that the status of Indian
tribes within the United States has fluctuated considerably within the last 200
years. At first they were considered foreign nations, capable of making treaties
with the United States Then they were considered "domestic dependent
nations" in a special protectorate relationship with the United States.4 Later,
the federal government attempted to "terminate" Indian tribes by breaking up
Indian land and forcing citizenship upon Indians.' More recently, Congress has
been supportive of tribal sovereignty and has provided tribes some protection
from suit.
Part IV studies the exclusive relationship between Congress and the tribes.
When the Constitution was adopted in 1787, it provided Congress with
authority to regulate Indian affairs, and since that time the courts have
recognized Congress' overarching authority in this area.6 Modem Congresses,
however, have been mindful of their overwhelming power and have generally
acted -- or not acted as the case may be - to ensure that the tribes are
allowed some degree of sovereignty. Instead of making tribes directly liable
in suit, Congress has generally provided alternative means of dispute
settlement.7 Part IV also examines the topic of waivers. Either the tribe or
1. For a discussion Qf the reasoning behind sovereign immunity, see infra Part II.
2. See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
3. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 53 (Rennard Strickland ct al.
eds., 1982).
4. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
5. Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-342, 348-349,
354, 381 (1994). For a discussion of this Act and its ramifications, see infra notes 60-70 and
accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (establishing Congress' plenary
power over Indian tribes); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (holding Congress'
plenary power so great as to enable it to abrogate treaties with Indian tribes); Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676, 698 (1990) (stating that "Congress... has the ultimate authority over Indian affairs").
7. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994)
(providing that persons with claims against tribes must use the Federal Tort Claims Procedures,
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Congress can waive tribal immunity, although Congress' ability to do so may
now be in question.8
Part V examines the development of tribal immunity through case law.
Unlike state immunity, which is written directly into the Constitution by the
Eleventh Amendment,9 tribal immunity is a product of case law. Modem tribal
immunity originated in the early 1900s and has grown into a recognized and
accepted doctrine - for the most part. This part will consider the major cases
influencing tribal immunity and will highlight the contradiction between
Congress' and the Supreme Court's attitudes toward the doctrine. It will pay
particular attention to Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida' and Kiowa Tribe
of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.," two Supreme Court cases
that have serious implications for the doctrine of tribal immunity.
The Origins of Sovereign Immunity and Its Applicability to Indian Tribes
Sovereign immunity, or freedom from suit, is not a new concept and is not
limited to Indian tribes. It can be traced to the English concept of the divine
right of royalty, which held that the monarch could do no wrong and therefore
no suit against the monarchy could be legitimate. 2
The modem interpretation of sovereign immunity in the United States,
derives more from the idea that lawsuits should not keep a government from
performing its essential functions than it does from any notion of the divine
right of monarchs." Supporters of sovereign immunity argue that a
government could be made bankrupt if citizens were allowed to pursue suits
against the national or state government. 4
These reasons underlie the development of significant immunity protections
for the federal and state governments, as well as for federal and state officials.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994), to seek compensation and that any compensation for such claims
will come from insurance obtained by the Secretary of the Interior).
8. See infra notes 239-45 and accompanying text.
9. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CoNs'r. amend. XI.
10. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
11. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1700 (1998).
12. For the Supreme Court's most recent consideration of the history of sovereign immunity,
see Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68-72, 102-14, 130-68 (1996). See also
id. at 1146-52, 1160-78 (Souter, J., dissenting) (delineating development of the common law
doctrine and posing an argument against its acceptance in the United States).
13. Bruce A. Wagman, Advancing Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Pathway to Power, 27
U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 440 (1993).
14. Il (citing Nevada v. Hail, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), which noted that states supported
sovereign immunity as a means of protecting themselves against debts due from the American
Revolution).
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The United States cannot be sued without its consent."5 As interpreted by the
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against the states"6
- even in state courts. 7 State officials are subject to liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,8 and the doctrine of Ex parte Young allows claimants to sue state
officials if the only relief sought is prospective injunctive relief, even if its
incidental consequence is to impact the state treasury. 9 Federal officials,
meanwhile, can be sued for monetary damages in their individual capacities
pursuant to an implied caused of action.'
Although claimants may have a cause of action against government officials
in theory, the fact is that these officials often enjoy a certain degree of
immunity. Federal legislators,2' judges," prosecutors, 2 and state
legislators all enjoy absolute immunity. Other state and federal officials
enjoy qualified immunity. '
These immunities were developed to address the financial and governmental
concern.,; mentioned earlier. The reasons for state and federal immunity,
however, also support sovereign immunity for Indian tribes. First, tribes did
not participate in the creation of the constitutional system of government and
therefore their interests are in a much mote precarious position than those of
15. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
16. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Although the text of the Amendment refers to
suits by citizens of other states and nlations, the Court has read the Amendment to bar virtually
all suits against the states. Id. Individual members of the Supreme Court have expressed their
frustrations with the Courtes overly expansive reading of a rather precise constitutional provision.
See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 788-90 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting his displeasure with the Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment).
17. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding that the claimant
could not sue a state official in his official capacity in state court because Michigan had not
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity).
18. Section 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). For a discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983's interplay with the Eleventh
Amendment, see generally Debra L. Watanuki, Federal Civil Rights: Fact or Fiction? A
Proposal to Remove Eleventh Amendment Immunity in Section 1983 Actions, 18 HASTINCS
CONST. L.Q. 695 (1991).
19. Ek parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
20. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
22. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978).
23. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1973).
24. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
25. State and federal officials are provided with qualified immunity when they could not
have reasonably known that their actions would have resulted in a constitutional deprivation.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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the states, which are protected by the Eleventh Amendment.' Second, while
states have generally prospered since their inclusion in the Union, such is not
the case for Indian tribes.' Unemployment on reservations usually exceeds
50 percent, and 603,000 of the estimated 1.8 million Indians in the United
States live below the poverty line.' Third, tribes often lack the legal resources
states have at their disposal when they need to defend themselves from
lawsuits." Finally, even the Supreme Court has stated that federal judicial
interference in tribal actions can do little more than "unsettle a tribal
government's ability to maintain authority.""
The Historical and Constitutional Status of Indian Tribes
Although it is commonly said that Christopher Columbus "discovered"
America, numerous Indian tribes already populated the Americas by the time
of his arrival' In fact, Leif Eriksson's brother is said to have encountered
Indians, known to Vikings as "Skrellings," when he landed somewhere along
the northeast coast of North America in 1006."
When the colonists came to America in the 1600s and 1700s, they treated
the native tribes as separate nations. The young republic entered into numerous
treaties - documents generally reserved for international relations - with the
tribes.3 Many of these treaties were military alliances created to bolster the
colonies' strength in the fight against the English.
26. Wagman, supra note 13, at 448, 464-65.
27. Id. For a discussion of the problems facing Indian tribes, see YERINGTON PAurrE TRIBE,
INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL GOVERNMENT 86-92 (Michael Hansen ed., 1985) [hereinafter TRIBAL
GOVERNMENT].
28. Bill Richardson, Indian Tribes Should Control Their Own Futures, DEs MOINEs REG.,
July 8, 1993, at A7.
29. Timothy W. Joranko, Tribal Self-Determination Unfettered: Toward a Rule of Absolute
Tribal Official Immunity from Damages in Federal Court, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 987, 1023 (1995).
30. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978); see Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) (stating that federal judicial interference would interfere with
tribal law-making authority).
31. See generally ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., THE INDIAN HERITAGE OF AMERICA (1968)
(discussing the various Indian groups that existed in the Americas prior to the arrival of
Europeans).
32. Id. at 294.
33. Joranko, supra note 29, at 989. According to Peter Nabokov:
The legal basis for making treaties with the Indians was established as early as the
sixteenth century by lawyers for the Spanish Court. Although vast portions of the
New World were claimed by the conquistadors, Spain still felt that the Indians
enjoyed some vague "aboriginal title" to the ountry .... Other Europeans and
Americans also granted Indians a "right of occupancy." Behind these manipulative
phrases and contradictory postures lay the white man's vacillation between greed
and conscience. He was determined to take possession of the territories he
"discovered," but he needed to feel he was acquiring them fairly and legally.
NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY 118 (Peter Nabokov ed., 1991).
34. Joranko, supra note 29, at 989. Unfortunately, the new republic would eventually begin
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While the colonies may have recognized tribes as nations, they also
attempted to control tribes within their sphere of influence. The Articles of
Confederation granted power over Indian tribes to both the state and federal
governments.3 The federal government was allowed to regulate trade with
and manage the affairs of Indians, but could not infringe upon the legislative
power of the states.O As with many other provisions of the Articles of
Confederation, this delineation of power proved to be confusing and self-
defeating for the federal government 7
When the Constitution was adopted in 1787, it gave Congress the
responsibility of managing Indian affairs, apparently to the exclusion of the
states?' [t allowed Congress to regulate commerce "with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.""' It also excluded
"Indians not taxed" from population counts. Finally, the Supremacy Clause
of Article IV elevated "all Treaties made, or which shall be made" as the
highest law of the land'
This separate status was reflected in the mechanisms the federal government
adopted to allow U.S. citizens to recover damages against Indian tribes. Before
1891, persons with claims against Indian tribes had to rely upon "wrongs or
depredations" clauses in treaties. 42 Under the treaties' procedures, claimants
would generally file proofs with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, who
would then compensate the claimants from funds due the tribe.43 The tribe
to use treaties as a means of weakening Indian tribes:
At rst, the European powers drew up treaties to cement relations with influential
tribes, to "bury the tomahawk" - to use the famous phrase found in an early
southern Plains treaty - with hostile Indians, and to formalize trading
partnerships. During the period of New World colonization, the warring European
nations used treaties to bolster their forces with Indian auxiliaries. As the white
population grew, however, and Indian power waned, the documents became thinly
disguised bills of sale, transferring ancient tribal lands into white hands.
NATIVE AMiERICAN TESTIMONY, supra note 33, at 118.
35. Wagman, supra note 13, at 420 n.5.
36. Id.; see also Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340, 356 (1908) (noting that the Articles
of Confederation gave the Congress sole power to regulate trade with and manage the affairs of
Indian tribes, provided that the legislative rights of the states were not infringed).
37. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1155 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that
the Articles of Confederation were obscure and ambiguous).
38. Wagman, supra note 13, at 426. Wagman notes that although the Constitution granted
the federal government control over Indian affairs, the states maintained some authority through
Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts. Il This authority was officially revoked in 1790 with the
Nonintercourse Act. Nonintercourse Act, I Stat. 329 (1790).
39. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
41. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
42. Jcranko, supra note 29, at 997.
43. Id.
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was not sued directly. This process was codified in 1891 when Congress
passed the Indian Depredation Act."
The judiciary, meanwhile, gave lip service to the sovereign integrity of the
Indian tribes. In the Marshall Trilogy,45 the Supreme Court recognized Indian
nations as separate, but then placed them under the protective control of
Congress. Cherokee Nation v. Georgi 6 labeled the tribes as "domestic
dependent nations" - not quite states but not quite foreign nations, either.4
One year later, the Court held that "Indian nations, their citizens, and their
territory remained completely apart from the states in which they were
located."48 Indians were also separate from the federal government, inasmuch
as they were considered citizens of their individual tribes, not citizens of the
United States4
The semi-sovereign status of Indians was affirmed repeatedly by the
judiciary during the late 1800s. Indians who committed crimes against other
Indians on Indian land could not be prosecuted in state or federal courtsY'
Laws passed by Congress were presumed to exclude Indians unless Congress
specifically stated otherwise5' and tribal governments were not required to
obey constitutional provisions.'
During the late 1800s, the tide changed for tribal sovereignty. The
Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871," ended the practice of treaty-making
44. Indian Depredation Act of Mar. 3, 1891, Ch. 538, 26 Stat. 851-54 (1891). The primary
differences between the original mechanism and the Indian Depredation Act are that under the
Act, the Court of Claims handles the victims' claims, and the claimants must prove the tribe in
question was in amity with the United States and not entitled to belligerent status under
international law. Id.
45. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
46. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
47. Id. at 17.
48. Joranko, supra note 29, at 989 (interpreting the holding of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832)).
49. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884) ("The members of those tribes owed immediate
allegiance to their several tribes, and were not part of the people of the United States.").
50. Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). This case is more commonly known
as Ex parte Crow Dog, representing the English translation of the petitioner's name. Id. Crow
Dog, a Brule Sioux, assassinated Spotted Tail, a Brule Sioux chief, on the Rosebud reservation.
Id. at 557. Crow Dog was arrested by the federal government and sentenced to hang. Id. The
Supreme Court reversed Crow Dog's sentence, stating that the federal government should not
infringe upon tribal matters. Id. at 571, 572. Under tribal orders, Crow Dog gave Spotted Tail's
family blood money in the form of horses and other goods as payments for his crimes. TRIBAL
GOVERNMENT, supra note 27, at 17.
51. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. at 100.
52. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1886) (holding that even the Fourteenth
Amendment did not apply to tribal government operations).
53. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871). Tacked onto the very bottom of
the Act was the following passage:
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with Indian tribes, although it did nothing to affect the requirement of mutual
agreement between Congress and the tribes. Fourteen years later, Congress
passed the Major Crimes Act of 1885," allowing the federal courts to have
jurisdiction over murder, rape, assault with intent to kill, manslaughter, arson,
burglary and robbery when they occurred between Indians on Indian land.'
Congress began to enact legislation touching upon internal tribal affairs and
the Supreme Court adopted the "plenary power" doctrine to legitimize these
acts." Warping Congress' protectorate role to its extreme, the Court held that
Congress' power to protect the tribes from their own "weakness and
helplessness"58 was so magnificent as to encompass the right to abrogate
federal-Indian treaties without any judicial standard to govern its exercise.59
Respect for tribal integrity disappeared in the early 1900s as Indians were
encouraged to sever all ties with their tribes and become U.S. citizens. The
Indian General Allotment Act of 1887' precursored this change in U.S.-Indian
relations. The Act cut tribal land into 80 or 160-acre allotments, which were
to be provided to Indians who renounced their tribal ties in favor of U.S.
citizenship.6' The land was to be completely alienable after 25 years,' thus
Provided, That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty; Provided further, That
nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation
of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or
tribe.
Id.
54. Id. Senator William Stewart of Nevada, arguing on behalf of the Act, stated, "I regard
all these Indian treaties as a sham. The idea of thirty or forty thousand men owning in common
what will furnish homes for five or ten million American citizens will not be tolerated." TRIBAL
GOVERNMENT, supra note 27, at 37.
55. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362 (1885).
56. Id. § 9,23 Stat. at 385. This Act was Congress' response to the Supreme Court's holding
in Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca, which negated any federal jurisdiction over murder on tribal land
where both the victim and suspect were members of the tribe. TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, supra note
27, at 37.
57. Joranko, supra note 29, at 991. The plenary power doctrine was adopted in United States
v. Kagama and allowed Congress to control the internal affairs between members of Indian tribes.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-80 (1886).
58. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
59. Joranko, supra note 29, at 991.
60. Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-342, 348-349,
354, 381 (1994). This Act is also known as the Dawes Act. TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, supra note
27, at 21.
61. Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1994). These guidelines were
not always followed:
An example of land loss experience by a tribe would be the Walker River
Reservation. In 1906, an agreement was signed by the tribe for the allotment of
the reservation. The tribe received 20-acre allotments rather than the 160 acre
tracts. Walker Lake was not included in the agreement and tribal members did not
understand this when they signed the agreement. The result was a loss of over
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posing a significant threat to the continuity of the reservation and the tribe.'
In 1924, U.S. citizenship was forced on all Indians."
The judiciary's approach to Indian tribes changed to keep pace with the
legislature. The Supreme Court reversed itself on the issue of citizenship,
holding that Indians could legally be made citizens of the United States.' It
also reversed its "express intention" rule that had allowed the exclusion of
Indians from federal regulation.'
While proponents of assimilation legislation had hoped that Indians would
desert their tribes and become middle class farmers,' such was not the case.
Indians generally maintained their tribal ties, but the assimilation laws ended
up costing the tribes more than two-thirds of their land." The impact of U.S.
assimilation practices was not lost on Congress, which in 1934 finally
recognized a tribal right to self-determination and sovereignty."
275,000 acres including the lake, which were opened to settlement and mining.
The tribe was left with only 50,000 acres.
TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 27, at 37.
62. Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1994).
63. According to Senator Teller of Colorado:
You propose to divide all this land and to give each Indian his quarter section, or
whatever he may have, and for twenty-five years he is not to sell it, mortgage it,
or dispense of it in any shape, and at the end of that time, he may sell it. It is safe
to predict that when that shall have been done, in thirty years thereafter, there will
not be an Indian on the continent, or there will be very few at the least, that will
have any land.
TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 27, at 37.
64. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (repealed 1952).
65. Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391 (1921).
66. See, e.g., Choteau v. Bumet, 283 U.S. 691,696 (1931) (holding that Indians were subject
to the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1918, even though the Act was silent as to them). The
Elk v. Wilkins requirement that Congress clearly express an intent to include Indian members in
legislation was thus replaced by Chateau's requirement of a "definitely expressed" intent to
exclude Indians from such legislation.
67. See JOSEPHY, supra note 31, at 350 ("The Dawes General Allotment Act, initiated and
supported by many persons who were sympathetic to the Indians, was passed with the argument
that it would give each Indian his own private plot of land and encourage him to become an
industrious farmer"). Needless to say, many Indians had problems with this philosophy. Speaking
before the Dawes Commission in 1881, Sitting Bull said:
If the great spirit had desired me to be a white man, he would have made me so
in the first place. He put in your heart certain wishes and plans, in my heart he
put other and different desires. Each man is good in his sight. It is not necessary
for eagles to be crows.
TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 27, at 86.
68. Joranko, supra note 29, at 995. In 1887, Indian tribes owned 138 million acres; by 1932,
90 million of those acres had been transferred to white owners. JOSEPHY, supra note 31, at 350.
69. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994). For a discussion of
the purposes of the Act, see Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934,70 MICH. L. REV. 955, 955-69 (1972) [hereinafter Tribal Self-Government]; see also
NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY, supra note 33, at 304-10 (discussing Commissioner John
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The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934" (IRA) was a significant step in
federal-Indian relations. It ended the allotment practices and curtailed the
Bureau of Indian Affairs' ability to micromanage tribal matters.71 At the same
time, it espoused the economic and political self-sufficiency of tribes.
Section 16 of the IRA attempted to stabilize tribal political entities by allowing
the tribe to adopt a constitution and bylaws.73 Section 17 allowed a tribe to
adopt a charter of incorporation so that the tribe could conduct business with
entities outside of the reservation.' These two sections are significant in that
they allow the tribe to waive its immunity from suit.7s The IRA was also
significant in that the Secretary of the Interior had to approve the tribe's
constitution, thereby forcing the U.S. to recognize tribal actions taken pursuant
to the tribal constitution.7
Federal-Indian relations soon suffered under Public Law 280,n a 1953
measure aimed at implementing the programs of termination and assimilation,
in which reservations would be terminated and Indians would be assimilated
into mainstream society.78 With tribal consent, the federal government would
cut off all health, law enforcement and educational services, leaving such
programs to the states." Reflecting lawmakers' concern with "lawlessness on
the reservations and the accompanying threat to Anglos living nearby,"'
Public Law 280 provided criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian land to five
states, and allowed other states to obtain such jurisdiction if they wished."'
Collier's advocacy of the IRA).
70. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994).
71. Trlbal Self-Government, supra note 69, at 955-69.
72. Id. Some tribes, such as the Pueblos and the Iroquois, rejected the IRA because it
replaced traditional tribal government with "white models of government." TRIBAL GOVERNMENT,
supra note 27, at 40.
73. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1994).
74. Id. § 477. The idea was that through its charter the tribe could waive immunity from
suit, thereby easing fears of contracting parties. Frank Pommershiem & Thomas Pechota, Tribal
Immunity, Tribal Courts and the Federal System: Emerging Contours and Frontiers, 31 S.D. L.
REV. 553, 559 (1986).
-75. There is some question as to whether the tribe can issue a waiver without congressional
approval. Wagman, supra note 13, at 432 n.94. For a discussion of the waiver doctrine and the
interplay between Congress and the tribes, see infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
76. TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 27, at 40.
77. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C, §§ 1161-
1162) (19514) (criminal jurisdiction), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)
(civil jurisdiction))[hereinafter Public Law 280].
78. Wagnaan, supra note 13, at 434. Public Law 280 implemented the termination program
outlined in a 1953 House concurrent resolution. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B 132
(1953). Sixty-one tribes were terminated under the program. TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, supra note
27, at 41. Between 1948 and 1957, Indian tribes lost approximately 3.3 million acres. NATIVE
AMERICAN TESTIMONY, supra note 33, at 356.
79. TIIBAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 27, at 41.
80. Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Indians, 22. UCLA L. REv. 535, 544-46 (1975).
81. Public Law 280, supra note 77. The five "mandatory" states were California, Minnesota,
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For the first time since the adoption of the Nonintercourse Act of 1790, states
were given authority over not just Indians, but Indian land.
Congress reevaluated its stance on tribal sovereignty, or lack thereof, when
it passed the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).' The Act reinstated
tribal sovereignty and provided the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,' perhaps the most celebrated modern case
expanding tribal sovereignty and tribal immunity. The Act made the Bill of
Rights applicable to tribal governments, which had previously enjoyed
exclusion from its provisions.' Further, it provided a model code of Indian
offenses for use in tribal courts.'O The Act required Indian consent be obtained
before a state could assume legal jurisdiction within Indian land, but it
provided federal courts a degree of authority to review actions taken by Indian
tribes.'
Congress and the Tribes: A Mutually Exclusive Relationship
Congressional Supremacy and Respect
Under the Constitution, Congress is the sole organ that may impose
restraints upon Indian tribes." This notion has been recognized repeatedly by
the Supreme Court, which stated that "Congress... has the ultimate authority
over Indian affairs."'  Further, Congress has the authority to change the
jurisdiction of the federal courtsY Therefore, Congress has the ultimate
authority to decide whether, how and where Indian tribes may be sued.
Generally speaking, however, modem Congresses have promoted immunity
for Indian tribes and tribal officials.' For example, Congress has repeatedly
refused to amend the ICRA to overcome Santa Clara's holding that the ICRA
does not provide a federal court cause of action." Instead, Congress declared
that "Congress and the Federal courts have repeatedly recognized tribal justice
Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin. Id.
82. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994).
83. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). For a discussion of this case, see
infra notes 139-56 and accompanying text.
84. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
85. Id. § 1311.
86. Id. § 1321-1325; TRIBAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 27, at 41. President Johnson said,
"We must affirm the right of the first Americans to remain Indians while exercising their rights
as Americans. We must affirm their rights to freedom of choice and self-determination." Id.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
88. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698 (1990).
89. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. i.
90. Joranko, supra note 29, at 1017.
91. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 383, 103d Cong., at 13 (1993) (suggesting that federal resources
be made available to tribal courts before any attempt to allow federal court review of the tribal
justice system); see also Vicki J. Limas. Employment Suits Against Indian Tribes: Balancing
Sovereign Rights and Civil Rights, 70 DEN. L. REV. 359, 387-89 (1993).
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systems as the appropriate forums for the adjudication of disputes affecting
personal and property rights."'
Congress has also provided alternative means of dispute settlement rather
than allow suits to proceed against tribes." Instead of allowing suits to be
levied against tribal employees, the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975' states that claimants must proceed through the
Federal Tort Claims mechanism," and that the Secretary of the Interior is
responsible for obtaining insurance for such claims."
Further, tribal governments were excluded from the major piece of
legislation that extends liability to state officials. This law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
is a congressionally-created cause of action against people who "act under color
of [state law]."' No mention is made of tribal law, implying that no such
cause of action could exist against tribal officials9 The Tenth Circuit has
adopted this interpretation," and thus far Congress has not amended 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 to provide any contradictory interpretation.
Waiving Tribal Immunity
While blanket immunity for tribes and tribal actors may at first glance seem
advantageous for a tribe, it can also have its disadvantages. If the tribe wishes
to conduct business outside of the reservation, it may find itself in a
detrimental position because non-Indian businesses could be easily discouraged
from interacting with the tribe for fear of sustaining injuries and having no
defendant against whom to act."m Practical concerns may drive a tribe to
waive its sovereign immunity in circumstances such as these.
In this context, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez"0' is a significant case. It
held that a waiver of immunity would be recognized, but only if such a waiver
92. Indian Tribal Justice Support, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).
93. See, e.g., Indian Depredation Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch, 538, 26 Stat. 851-54 (1891)
(providing an intervening mechanism between non-Indian claimants and Indian tribes); Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994) (providing that persons
with claims against tribes must use the Federal Tort Claims procedure, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680
(1994), to seek compensation and that any compensation for such claims will come from
insurance obtained by the Secretary of the Interior).
94. Id § 450.
95. d § 4501(d). The Federal Tort Claims procedure allows jurisdiction to persons with
claims against the United States. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994).
96. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450(c)(1) (1994).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Foran extensive look at the Supreme Court's handling of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 cases and the section's interaction with the Eleventh Amendment, see generally
PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RloIrrs AcTIoNs: SEcnON 1983 AND RELATED
STATuTEs (2d ed. Supps. 1994 & 1996).
98. Joranko, supra note 29, at 1019.
99. Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1980).
100. Joranko, supra note 29, at 1017.
101. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 139-56 and
accompanying text.
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The Court then considered the implications created by the act of Congress
permitting jurisdiction over Tumer's claims. In essence, the Court found the act
to be a grant of jurisdiction over a claim that simply did not exist."
Congress could authorize the Court of Claims to hear whatever cases it wanted,
but the act did not remedy the fact that Turner had no substantive right to sue
a government for injuries resulting from mob violence."
Even though Brandeis had earlier emphasized that sovereign immunity had
nothing to do with the tribe's freedom from liability, his discussion of the act's
attempt to authorize a suit against the tribe would lay the foundation for later
assertions of a tribal immunity doctrine. After asserting that the act did not
impose any liability on the tribe, and after noting that the tribe had been
dissolved, Justice Brandeis held that "[w]ithout authorization from Congress,
the Nation could not then have been sued in any court; at least without its
consent.""
Regardless of Justice Brandeis' intent, Turner's language regarding tribal
consent and immunity from suit would eventually find itself adopted in cases
articulating a doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity." Turner would thus
become a basis for a judicially-created doctrine - a basis that would be
seriously challenged nearly eighty years later."
Championing Tribal Immunity: 1940 to 1980
Any discussion of modern tribal immunity must begin with United States
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co." In this 1940 case, the United
States filed suit on behalf of Indian tribes that had dissolved but wanted to
recover royalties from a mining operation. "' The defendant filed a cross-
claim against the tribes for a prior judgment.' The tribes agreed to pay part
of the claim, but refused to pay in full.'
Holding for the tribes on the remainder of the cross-claim, the Supreme
Court stated that neither the tribes nor tribal officials acting within the scope
of their authority could be subjected to nonconsensual suit in any court -
tribal, state or federal." Relying upon Turner, the Court held that the public
123. Id.
124. d
125. Id
126. See, e.g., United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
127. The Supreme Court would reexamine Turner's rationale in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma
v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. See infra notes 259-65 and accompanying text (discussing
Kiowa's interpretation of Turner).
128. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
129. Id. at 510.
130. Id at 510-11.
131. Id. at 511.
132. Id at 512-13.
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policy that supported tribal immunity did not expire with the tribe.' As to
the cross-claim, the Court held that "[t]he sovereignty possessing immunity
should not be compelled to defend against cross-actions away from its own
territory or in courts, not of its own choice, merely because the debtor was
unavailable except outside the jurisdiction of the sovereign's consent."" This
public policy is especially important when dealing with Indian nations and their
"unusual governmental organization and peculiar problems."'35
The Court then considered the argument that the tribes' failure to object to
the state court's jurisdiction was a waiver of their immunity. The argument
failed to persuade the justices, who held that tribal officials do not have the
authority to waive the tribes' immunity." "If the contrary were true, it would
subject the government to suit in any court in the discretion of its responsible
officers."'3  In effect, the tribes were granted immunity as broad as that given
to the fideral government."
The Court gave tribal immunity another boost in 1978 with Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez.3' Female members of the pueblo sued both the pueblo
and its officials for prospective relief in federal court, alleging constitutional
violations under the Indian Civil Rights Act.4" While the ICRA did indeed
provide for the protection of certain rights within the Bill of Rights, "' it
provided no clear remedy other than by writ of habeas corpus. "2
The Court began by paying homage to the independence of tribal
governments. Indian tribes, according to the Court, "have the power to make
their own substantive law in internal matters and to enforce that law in their
own fo:rums." 3 Although the tribes were not present at the Constitutional
Convention and thus are "unconstrained" by the Constitution's provisions, the
Court recognized that Congress could make constitutional provisions applicable
to tribes and that the ICRA was an exercise of this power. '"
133. Id at 512.
134. Id at 513.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Vetter, supra note 104, at 171.
139. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
140. Id at 51. A female member of the pueblo and her daughter sued because a pueblo
ordinance denied tribal membership to children of women who married outside of the pueblo, but
did not deny membership to children of men who married outside of the tribe. Id.
141. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994). The specific section at issue
was section 1302(8), which states that "[no] Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. §
1302(8).
142. Id. § 1303 ("The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person,
in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of the Indian tribe").
143. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55-56 (citations omitted).
144. Id. at 56.
[Vol. 24
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol24/iss1/16
No. 1] THE EVOLUTION OF TRIBAL IMMUNITY 111
was "unequivocally and expressly stated.""n If the waiver made no mention
of federal court, a suit against a tribe in federal court would not be allowed."
If a waiver mentioned only one legislative act by which a tribe could be
subjected to suit, only an action under that act would be allowed to
proceed."
The relationship between Congress and Indian tribes is important with
respect to the issue of waiver. A waiver can be legitimate only if it comes
from either the tribe"( or Congress through a statute invoking such a
waiver." Given the modem Congresses' respect for tribal integrity and
sovereignty, this generally means that the tribe alone will be the one to
determine when immunity will be waived." Further, the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida raises doubts about the
power of Congress to freely abrogate tribal immunity."
The Evolution of Tribal Immunity
A Muted Beginning: Turner v. United States
Ask students of tribal immunity to identify the case upon which the doctrine
was founded and only a few of them might name Turner v. United States."09
Turner is often overlooked in analyses of tribal immunity case law, but its role
in the development of that case law is integral to understanding the Supreme
Court's current attitude toward the doctrine."'
In Turner, the five bands of the Creek nation enacted a statute that allowed
members to enclose portions of commonly held land and use them for
pastures."' Turner and his colleagues purchased some of this land pursuant
to the terms of the statute, and began to erect fences."2 Unfortunately for
102. Id. at 58.
103. Bank of Oklahoma v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1992)
(finding that waiver provision in contract was ambiguous as to all for a but tribal court, thereby
prohibiting suit in any forum other than tribal court).
104. William W. Vetter, Doing Business with Indians and the Three "S"es: Secretarial
Approval, Sovereign Immunity, and Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 169, 171
(1994).
105. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc), affid on
other grounds, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
106. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
107. See, e.g., Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322 (1994) (requiring tribal
consent before a state can assume jurisdiction over a tribe).
108. See generally Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
109. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
110. The Court's recent decision in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc., focused on Turner as the basis for the development of tribal immunity. Kiowa
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs. Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1700, 1703-04 (1998). For a
discussion of the Court's interpretation of Turner and the judicial doctrine it created, see infra
notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
111. Turner, 248 U.S. at 355.
112. Id. The terms of the statute required the district judges for the tribe to call an election
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
Turner, some of his neighbors disagreed with his venture and threatened to
destroy his fences."' Turner received an injunction from a federal court
prohibiting tribal officials from interfering with his pasture, but other tribal
members eventually destroyed the 80-mile fence."' Turner sought
compensation through the available tribal mechanisms, but the tribe failed to
make any payments."' Shortly thereafter, the tribal organization was
dissolved." 6 Turner instituted his claim against the Creek nation and the
United States as trustee of the nation's funds in the Court of Claims, pursuant
to an act of Congress specifically permitting the action."7
The Court denied Turner the relief he sought, based primarily on the
premise that a government cannot be held responsible for injuries to property
caused by mob violence."' Justice Brandeis noted that the United States had
recognized the Creek nation as "a distinct political community, with which it
made treaties and which within its own territory administered its own internal
affairs..."9 Because the Creek nation was recognized as a distinct government,
it was entitled to the same freedom from liability for mob violence that state
and municipal governments enjoyed."
The Court emphasized the fact that the Creek's freedom from liability had
little to do with sovereign immunity as such. According to Brandeis, "[tihe
fundamental obstacle to recovery is not the immunity of a sovereign to suit, but
the lack of a substantive right to recover the damages resulting from failure of
a government or its officers to keep the peace.'' Turner would not be
allowed to recover on the theory that the tribe owed him more of a duty than
it owed to anyone else.'"
if a person wished to establish a pasture of larger than one square mile. Id. The election was held
and Turner was permitted to establish his pasture. Id.
113. Id. at 356.
114. Ild.
115. 1l At one point, the tribal council voted to provide compensation, but the tribal chief
vetoed the decision. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 357. The act allowing the suit stated:
T'hat the Court of Claims is hereby authorized to consider and adjudicate and
render judgment as law and equity may require in the matter of the claim of
Clarence W. Turner, of Muskogee, Oklahoma, against the Creek Nation, for the
destruction of personal property and the value of the loss of the pasture of the said
Turner, or his assigns, by the action of any of the responsible Creek authorities,
or with their cognizance and acquiescence, either party to said cause in the Court
of Claims to have the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Id. at 356-57 (quoting Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, 35 Stat. 444, 457 (1908)).
118. Id. at 357-58.
119. Id. at 357.
120. Id. at 358.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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The Supreme Court then articulated several substantial rules in Santa Clara.
First, it held that the tribe had sovereign immunity from suit,4 ' and that no
suit would be allowed to proceed against the tribe because the ICRA contained
no express waiver of tribal immunity.". For a suit to be allowed against a
tribe, Congress must have "unequivocally expressed" its intention to create such
a waiver.47 The Court found that Title I of the ICRA did not give the federal
courts jurisdiction, instead limiting relief to a writ of habeas corpus.'48
Second, the Court held that the pueblo's governor did not fall under the
umbrella of tribal sovereign immunity,49 stating that an implied federal cause
of action would derive from Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents. 5 Despite this precedent, the Court used a policy argument to insulate
tribal officials from suit. The Court recognized that by forcing Indian tribes to
litigate tribal matters in a forum other than their own would "'undermine the
authority of the tribal cour[t] ... and hence ... infringe on the right of the
Indians to govern themselves."""' Thus, the Court was hesitant to allow a
waiver of tribal immunity without a clear indication from Congress.'"2
The justices conceded that the claimants were the types of persons for
whom the ICRA was enacted, and that the courts have inferred a federal cause
of action for violations of civil rights.' " The Court, however, found that the
ICRA's statutory scheme and legislative history evidenced Congress' deliberate
decision to avoid a waiver of tribal immunity." Given Congress' deliberate
exercise of its plenary power, the Court refrained from holding tribal officials
to the same standards as federal and state officials.' The purposes of the
ICRA - to protect a tribe's "ability to maintain itself as a culturally and
politically distinct entity," as well as to protect the tribe's authority and
economy - mandated the protection of tribal officials from suit, lest the
sovereignty of the tribe itself be affected.'1
145. Id. at 58 (citing Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919), and United States
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1940)).
146. Id
147. Id (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)).
148. Id at 59.
149. Id at 59.
150. Id at 61 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395
(1971) (stating that an implied federal cause of action exists when a federal official violates a
person's Fourth Amendment rights)).
151. Id. at 59.
152. Id at 60.
153. Id. at 61.
154. Id. at 61-70 (noting the statutes emphasis on tribal self-government and Congress' use
of habeas corpus to balance the competing interests of preventing injustice by tribes and
preventing undue interference in tribal matters).
155. Id at 71.
156. Id at 72.
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Simply because a tribe and, for all practical purposes, tribal officials are
immune from suit in federal and state court does not mean that claimants have
no forum in which to argue their cases. Tribal courts are available to persons
with grievances against a tribe or its members." In fact, the Supreme Court
has determined that going through tribal courts may be the only way claimants
will have their wrongs addressed.'58
In National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,' the
victim of a car accident occurring on the Crow Indian Reservation filed suit in
tribal court against the defendant and his insurance company." The
defendant defaulted in tribal court.'6' The insurer brought suit in federal court
to enjoin the tribal action, arguing that the tribal court and tribal judge were
acting beyond their jurisdiction." The insurer relied upon the Court's
previous holding in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,"6 which held that
tribal courts did not have jurisdiction to impose criminal penalties upon non-
Indians. 4
The Court found the Oliphant rule uncompelling, given that Congress had
not restricted tribal jurisdiction over civil actions as it had with criminal
actions."s Instead, the Court believed the issue required a "careful
examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to Which that sovereignty has been
altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes,
Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and
administrative or judicial decisions.""
The Court preferred to leave the analysis in the hands of the tribal court in
order to promote the policy of tribal self-government." The court whose
jurisdiction was being challenged should have the first opportunity to evaluate
the merits of the challenge.'" By giving the tribal court the opportunity to
develop a complete record, moreover, the "orderly administration of justice in
the federal courts would be served."'' The insurer was thus required to
157. For a discussion of tribal court jurisdiction, see Vetter, supra note 105, at 185.88.
158. See, e.g., National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845
(1985) (holding that persons with claims against tribes must exhaust all tribal remedies prior to
bringing suit against the tribe in federal court in federal question cases); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v.
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (extending the holding of National Farmers Union to diversity
cases).
159. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
160. Id. at 847.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
164. ld. at 204.
165. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 854.
166. Id. at 855-56.
167. Id. at 856.
168. Id.
169. ld The court was referring to both the need for a complete record upon appeal and the
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contest tribal court jurisdiction before the tribal court, thereby exhausting all
tribal remedies, prior to initiating suit in federal court for a federal question
case. 
°
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante extended the holding of
National Farmers Union to diversity cases." Iowa Mutual involved an
automobile insurer who sought a declaratory judgment that an auto accident
being litigated in a Blackfeet Tribal Court action was outside of the insurer's
policy." Noting the federal policy promoting tribal self-government, the
Court held that tribal remedies must be exhausted in diversity cases, as well as
in federal question cases." Once all tribal remedies had been exhausted, the
claimant could bring an action in federal court in order to challenge the tribal
court's jurisdiction.'75 The tribal court's rulings on the merits of the dispute,
however, would be binding upon the federal court unless the federal court
determined that the tribal court was acting outside of its jurisdiction.76
A Turn for the Worse? 1980 to 1996
The development of tribal immunity case law to this point seemed to
suggest a strong presumption in favor of tribal sovereign immunity. Yet several
cases after 1980 suggest the judiciary, particularly the lower federal courts,
might be more willing to interfere on behalf of claimants than was previously
thought.
In 1980, the Tenth Circuit decided Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe &
Shoshone Tribes" and in doing so went above and beyond the call of duty
to find tribal sovereign immunity nonexistent. The case involved plaintiffs who
owned land within a reservation that contained a significant non-Indian
population. 7 The tribe's business council closed an access road to the
plaintiffs' hunting lodge after an Indian family complained of the road running
through their land." The tribal court refused to hear the plaintiffs' case, so
the plaintiffs sued in state and federal courts, with the state case eventually
removed to federal court."
need for federal courts to gain a better understanding of the workings of the tribal courts. Id.
170. Id. at 857.
171. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
172. Id. at 19.
173. Id. at 12-13.
174. Id. at 19.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
178. Id. at 683.
179. Id. at 684.
180. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit distinguished the facts of Dry Creek from those in Santa
Clara to deny the tribe's claim of immunity.'' In Santa Clara, the Court
said, the issue was an internal tribal matter affecting tribal members who had
access to their own elected officials and tribal machinery." In Dry Creek,
however, no tribal forum existed and the issue involved non-Indians.'"
Hence, the issue did not constitute "internal tribal affairs" and the tribe could
not use sovereign immunity as a defense under the ICRA.'8 The Tenth
Circuit did not address the issue of whether Congress had granted an express
waiver, as was required in Santa Clara,' nor did it address the issue of the
tribal court's jurisdictional rights, as required in National Farmers Union."
Thus, there is some disagreement as to whether the Tenth Circuit should have
even discussed the merits of the plaintiffs' claim.'"
Furthermore, critics have targeted Dry Creek because it held that "[tihere
has to be a forum where the dispute can be settled."'"2 If this argument were
legitimate, then sovereign immunity would sometimes have to be waived for
states and the federal government because prior case law regarding immunity
for these, entities summarily disallows a forum for some complaints. For
example, the holding of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida creates a non-
forum dilemma in which federal courts, which have exclusive jurisdiction over
patent or copyright cases, may be barred from deciding patent or copyright
cases brought against a state.'2 In yet another example, a claimant who wants
to sue a state official for monetary damages in federal court for an action taken
in the official's official capacity would have his or her claim dismissed because
of the official's qualified immunity."' The claimant would also be precluded
from bringing such an action in state court, however, under Will v. Michigan
Department of State Police.9' The claimant in Will purposely brought suit in
state court to avoid the Eleventh Amendment immunities, yet the Supreme
181. Id. at 685.
182. 1&
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
186. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
187. Wagman, supra note 13, at 451.
188. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d at 685.
189. This result would occur because Congress' power to regulate patents comes from Article
I, which the Seminole Court said was an improper vehicle for abrogating state immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment.
190. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982). In such a case, the claim is considered
to be one against the state, with the Eleventh Amendment barring the recovery of monetary
damages. Id. The suit could proceed if only an injunction were sought. Id.
191. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding a suit against
state officials acting in their official capacity not allowable in state courts).
[Vol. 24
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol24/iss1/16
No. 1] THE EVOLUTION OF TRIBAL IMMUNITY 119
Court construed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so narrowly that, for all practical purposes,
it applied the immunity doctrine to the state court anyway. 92
Dry Creek does not have wide support among other federal circuits, or even
the Tenth Circuit anymore. The Tenth Circuit has often refused to apply its
holding in Dry Creek to other cases involving tribal sovereign immunity under
the ICRA.'93 Other circuit courts have also hesitated to apply Dry Creek's
reasoning.94
The Supreme Court reentered the fray in 1991 with Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,'95 a case that both
reaffirmed and reassessed tribal immunity." Oklahoma Tax Commission
involved Oklahoma's attempt to require the tribe to collect state taxes on
cigarettes it sold to non-Indians on the reservation."9 The tribe sought an
injunction in federal court and the state counterclaimed to prevent the tribe
from selling cigarettes to non-Indians without the tax." Although the
overarching purpose of the case was to determine whether states had a right to
tax the sale of cigarettes to non-Indians on the reservation," Justice
Rehnquist also delved into the issue of tribal immunity.'n
While Rehnquist made a blanket statement supporting tribal immunity from
counterclaims, he managed to work his way around such immunity. The Court
reaffirmed United States Fidelity's rule that a "tribe does not waive its
sovereign immunity from actions that could not otherwise be brought against
it merely because those actions were pleaded in a counterclaim to an action
filed by the tribe."'" Despite this apparent support for tribal immunity, the
Court still considered the merits of the counterclaim against the tribe by
asserting that the question was "fairly subsumed in the 'questions presented' in
the petition for certiori."'a
Oklahoma urged three bases upon which the Court could rule in its favor.
First, Oklahoma argued that the Court could find an implied waiver of the
tribe's immunity in the tribe's request for an injunction against the state's tax
collection plan. Rehnquist rejected this argument, based upon the Court's
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Bank of Oklahoma v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th
Cir. 1992) (refusing to apply Dry Creek); Enterprise Management Consultants v. United States
ex rel. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 892 (10th Cir. 1989) (Dry Creek should be narrowly interpreted).
194. Limas, supra note 91, at 373 nn.106-07.
195. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
196. See Wagman, supra note 13, at 465 (discussing how the Court validated tribal
immunity, but then suggested ways around it).
197. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. at 507.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 506.
200. Id. at 509-14.
201. Id. at 509.
202. Id. at 512.
203. Id. at 509.
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previous holding in United States Fidelity.' Oklahoma then argued that the
Court should either narrow or completely abandon its tribal immunity
doctrine'a Rehnquist found fault with this argument, noting Congress'
continued support for the doctrine.' Finally, Oklahoma asked the Court to
distinguish between tribal activities undertaken on tribal trust land and those
undertaken on reservations.' This argument failed on the grounds that the
distinction requested by Oklahoma was one that had never been recognized by
the CourtY
Although his majority opinion favored the tribe, Rehnquist stated that the
Court has "never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe are not liable
for damages in actions brought by the State."' This is contrary to Santa
Clara, which held that although tribal officials do not share the same immunity
from suit as does the tribe, they are protected from suit for policy reasons.2"
Rehnquist even went so far as to suggest that states attempt a legislative
reversal of tribal immunity if they were truly adverse to it.21'
While the Court appeared to reaffirm its stance in favor of tribal immunity,
it began to poke substantial holes in the protection afforded. Tribal officials
were espoused as potential targets for suit,2t2 tribes were discouraged from
making broad pleadings lest they should lose their immunity via a
counterclaim," 3 and states were encouraged to take up legislative arms against
the doctrine of tribal immunity"
To Abrogate or Not to Abrogate? 1996 to 1998
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida2 5
Until recently, the question of whether Congress has the power to abrogate
tribal immunity was easy to answer. As seen in Santa Clara, Congress could
indeed abrogate a tribe's immunity from suit, as long as such a waiver was
unequivocally expressed.2 6 Santa Clara's clear holding, however, became
muddied in 1996. While not directly confronting the issue of tribal immunity,
204. Id.
205. Id. at 510.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 511. Trust land is held in trust by the United States for the benefit of Indian
tribes. Id.
208. l
209. Id. at 514.
210. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
211. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 514
(1991).
212. Id. at 514.
213. Id. at 512.
214. ld. at 514.
215. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
216. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
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the Supreme Court's holding in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida implies
that Congress' power to subject Indian tribes to suit may not be as
unquestionable as once thought.
The thrust of Seminole dealt not with any issue of tribal immunity, but with
Congress' ability to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity via the Indian
Commerce Clause." The statute in question was the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA),"' which allows tribes to conduct certain gaming
activities within a state if they enter into a valid gaming compact with that
state22 Under the Act, the state is required to negotiate in good faith with
the tribes. 0 This duty is judicially enforceable under the Act, which gives
the U.S. district courts jurisdiction to hear "causes of action initiated by an
Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to ... conduct such negotiations
in good faith.""' When Florida officials refused to negotiate with the
Seminole tribe, the tribe sued the state of Florida and Florida Governor Lawton
Chiles.'
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found for the Florida
respondents. Rehnquist considered two issues in his analysis: "(1) Does the
Eleventh Amendment prevent Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes
against States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause?; and (2) Does the doctrine of Ex
parte Young permit suits against a state's governor for prospective injunctive
relief to enforce the good faith bargaining requirement of the Act?"'
To analyze the first issue, Rehnquist considered whether Congress had
"unequivocally expressed" an intent to waive a state's immunity and whether
Congress had acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of power."'"4 It was clear
to Rehnquist that the IGRA provided an "'unmistakably clear' statement of
Congress' intent to abrogate."'  Therefore, the statute was safe on the first
factor.
The second factor, however, would sound the statute's deathknell - at least
as far as abrogation was concerned. Rehnquist noted that until the Supreme
217. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 65. The Indian Commerce Clause is
simply the latter part of the foreign commerce and interstate commerce clauses: "The Congress
shall have the Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONsT. art. I. § 8, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
218. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710 (1994).
219. Id. § 2710(d)(1).
220. Id. § 2710(d)(3).
221. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
222. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 51 (1996).
223. Id. at 53.
224. Id. at 55.
225. Id. at 56 ("In sum, we think that the numerous references to the 'State' in the text of §
2710(d)(7)(B) make it indubitable that Congress intended through the Act to abrogate the States'
sovereign immunity from suit.").
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Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,' the Court had never
held that the Commerce Clause gave Congress any power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity.m Instead, the only source of congressional abrogation
power the Court had been willing to recognize came from section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' In that amendment, the language allowing
abrogation was unmistakable.' The Commerce Clause could provide no such
unmistakable intent, and Rehnquist was hesitant to allow Congress to modify
the courts' Article II jurisdiction via reference to an Article I power that was
not intended for such a purpose.m Thus, Congress, in using the Indian
Commerce Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity, was not acting
pursuant to a valid exercise of power.'
Just to be safe, the Court buttressed its argument with a bit of constitutional
history. The Court noted that its decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer"' allowed
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to serve as a mechanism for abrogation
based upon the timing of the amendment's adoption."3 State sovereign
immunity was formally recognized with the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment. The Court could assume that later constitutional provisions
allowing abrogation - such as section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment -
were adopted with the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in mind.' The
Court could not, however, support the "limitation of the principle embodied in
the Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the
Constitution."' 5
The Court then went on to hold that the Florida governor was also immune
from suit, despite the doctrine of Ex parte Young.' While Ex parte Young
generally allowed suits against state officials as a means of obtaining
prospective injunctive relief, the Seminole Court held that because the IGRA
set forth a complex remedial scheme for the enforcement of its provisions,
226. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
227. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 65.
228. L Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have the
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5.
229. Id.
230. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 65. Justice Rehnquist wrote: "As the
dissent in Union Gas recognized, the plurality's conclusion - that Congress could under Article
I expand the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III - contradicted our
unanimous approach to Article III as setting forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal
court jurisdiction." Id (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.. 491 U.S. 1. 39 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
231. Id.
232. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
233. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 65-66.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 66.
236. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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decision was later sustained by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals.' The U.S.
Supreme Court took the case and reversed the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, but
not without some hesitation s
The Supreme Court winced at Oklahoma's attempt to subject Indians to suit
through the doctrine of comity." The Court noted that "the immunity
possessed by Indian tribes is not coextensive with that of the States. ''5
Because Indian tribes were not at the Constitutional Convention and were not
part of the "mutuality of concession" as were the states, tribal immunity is a
matter of federal law and not "subject to diminution by the States."'"
The Court noted that although tribal immunity was well settled, its
development was purely accidental and purely a creation of the judiciary.'
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the decision upon
which the doctrine of tribal immunity was based, Turner v. United States, did
not support the doctrimne." The Court in Turner merely assumed tribal
immunity existed for the sake of argument and was not creating a new
doctrine."' The unique facts of the case - the tribal unit had dissolved and
therefore could not be subjected to suit unless Congress authorized such a
suit - governed the Turner Court's references to tribal immunity.' As such,
Turner was "a slender reed for supporting the principle of tribal sovereignimmunity."''
Kennedy recognized that Supreme Courts of the past had applied the
doctrine of tribal immunity despite its weak foundation in Turner.' Kennedy
explained this systematic regurgitation of an accidental doctrine by putting the
blame on Congress. Kennedy argued that the Supreme Court retained the
doctrine because Congress often chose not to abrogate tribal immunity in order
to promote tribal economic development and self-sufficiency.'
254. Id.
255. d. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declined to review the judgment, so the case went
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.
256. Id. at 1703. Comity applies when a sovereign that allows itself to be sued permits its
citizens to sue other sovereigns in its courts. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id
261. Id. at 1704.
262. Id. "'he tribal government had been dissolved. Without authorization from Congress,
the Nation could not have been sued in any court; at least without its consent." Id. (quoting
Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919)).
263. Id.
264. Id. (mentioning, for example, United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309
U.S. 506 (1940); Santa Clam Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991)).
265. Turner, 248 U.S. at 358.
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The Kiowa Court was clear in its disagreement with the rationale supporting
tribal immunity. The Court held that a blanket rule supporting tribal immunity
does not take into account the fact that tribal activities have broken into non-
traditional commercial enterprises.' Given the expanding scope of tribal
activities, tribal immunity can present a danger to those who are harmed by a
tribe's activities yet have no forum in which to argue their claims. 7 In other
words, tribal immunity has developed into a doctrine that is more than large
enough to protect the legitimate interests of tribes, but so large that it
unnecessarily harms those who interact with tribes and are injured by them.'
Despite its attitude toward the doctrine of tribal immunity, the Supreme
Court adhered to the doctrine in Kiowa. Once again, the Court looked to
Congress for guidance, and discovered that Congress has maintained its support
for tribal immunity.' The Court likened tribal immunity to foreign sovereign
immunity, where Congress had the ultimate power to expand or limit the
doctrineY Thus, although "the Court has taken the lead in drawing the
bounds of tribal immunity, Congress, subject to constitutional limitations, can
alter its limits through explicit legislation.""'
While the ultimate holding of Kiowa upheld the tribe's immunity from suit,
the Court was clear in its disdain for the doctrine. The Court used the case to
send an unambiguous message to Congress. Recognizing the need to defer to
Congress, the Court suggested that "Congress 'has occasionally authorized
limited classes of suits against Indian tribes' and 'has always been at liberty to
dispense with such tribal immunity or to limit it.""m
Conclusion
The status of Indian tribes within the governmental structure of the United
States has never been crystal clear. The debate becomes even more confused
266. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs. Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1700, 1704 (1998).
267. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)).
268. Id. According to the Court:
In our interdependent and mobile society, however, tribal immunity extends
beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-governance. This is evident when
tribes take part in the Nation's commerce. Tribal enterprises now include ski
e;orts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians. In this economic context,
immunity can harm those who are unaware that they are dealing with a tribe, who
do not know of tribal immunity, or who have no choice in the matter, as in the
case of tort victims.
Id.
269. Id. at 1705.
270. Id. The Court noted that foreign sovereign immunity began as a judicial doctrine, but
was later codified by Congress with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Id.; see Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605, 1607 (1994).
271. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. at 1705.
272. Id. (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
510 (1991)).
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Congress necessarily meant for such a scheme to be the only form of relief. 7
As Rehnquist stated, "it is difficult to see why an Indian tribe would suffer
through the intricate scheme of § 2710(d)(7) when more complete and more
immediate relief would be available under Ex parte Young."" 8
Although Seminole is not a tribal immunity case, it has significant
implications for the future of tribal immunity. While Union Gas allowed
Congress to use the Commerce Clause as a means of abrogating state
immunity, it was only a plurality opinion and was overruled by Seminole's 5-4
majority. This would imply that any attempt to abrogate or waive tribal
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause would also be met with some
skepticism by the Court.
While there are arguments for allowing Congress more power to abrogate
tribal immunity - i.e., the history of congressional regulation and the tribes'
trust relationship with the federal government - there are even stronger
arguments for limiting Congress' abrogation power as to tribes. After all, tribes
had no say in the making of the Constitutione9 and until recently were not
even subject to it provisions.
The Seminole majority clearly stated that the only provision Congress could
use to abrogate state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment was section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment."4 If this ruling is extended to tribal immunity,
congressional ability to waive tribal immunity will be severely limited. As it
currently stands, Congress need merely make an unequivocal expression of
intent to abrogate tribal immunity, without any reference to a specific
constitutional provision."
The question that must be addressed, of course, is whether tribal immunity
is comparable to state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. This is a
necessary question, as Seminole's holding is based on the states' Eleventh
Amendment protections as opposed to tribal immunity case law. It is clear by
the text of the Amendment that tribes are not covered by its immunity
protections.' 3 Yet the Supreme Court has allowed tribal immunity to
encompass virtually the same protections as offered states under the Eleventh
Amendment.' In fact, tribes and tribal officials actually have more
237. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 74-75.
238. l at 75.
239. Joranko, supra note 29, at 988.
240. Compare Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1886) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not applicable to tribal governments) with Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302 (1994) (making basic constitutional provisions, including the Fourteenth Amendment,
applicable to Indian tribes).
241. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 65-66.
242. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
243. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
244. See, e.g., United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940)
(holding that neither the tribe nor its tribal officials could be subjected to nonconsensual suit in
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protection from suit than do states and state officials, inasmuch as tribes and
tribal officials have not been included within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Thus, the status of the immunity afforded to states and tribes is essentially the
same.
It would then appear that Congress' ability to waive tribal immunity at will
might have been weakened. There are, however, two important caveats. First,
the Rehnquist court is well known for its animosity toward tribal immunityu"
and therefore reliance on the reasoning behind Rehnquist's disapproval of
congressional abrogation in Seminole might be misguided. Second, Rehnquist's
opinion in Seminole alludes to a difference between federal power over states
and federal power over tribes.2 He noted that "[I]f anything, the Indian
commerce clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the states to
the fedeTal government than does the interstate commerce clause."27 This
suggests that the Rehnquist court might allow congressional abrogation of tribal
immunity despite the reasoning in Seminole, simply based on the degree to
which Congress has retained control over tribal functions to the exclusion of
the states."I
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v, Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.24
If Seminole hinted at the Supreme Court's disdain for tribal immunity,
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. left no doubts.
The Kiowa tribe entered into an agreement with Manufacturing Technologies
to purchase stocks.' A tribal official signed a promissory note, which did
not specify any governing law but merely asserted the sovereign immunity
rights of the tribe.2  When the tribe defaulted and a question arose as to
whether the note had been signed off the Kiowa reservation, Manufacturing
Technologies sued on the note in state court." The tribe moved to dismiss,
based upon its tribal immunity. 3 The tribe's motion was denied and this
any forum); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (stating tribes and tribal officials
are immune from suit, unless such immunity is waive by either Congress or the tribe).
245. See Wagman, supra note 13, at 465-70.
246. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.44, 63 (1996).
247. Id.
248. Congressional authority over the tribes is nearly all-encompassing. See supra notes 87-
89 and accompanying text. Because tribes do not enjoy the same degree of "separateness" from
Congress as do the states, the courts may be more likely to find congressional power to abrogate.
This possibility is alluded to by the Seminole Court: "Indeed, it was in those circumstances where
Congress exercised complete authority that Justice Brennan thought the power to abrogate most
necessary." Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 17 (1989)).
249. K1iowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs. Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1700 (1998).
250. ld. at 1702. The stocks at issue were stocks of Clinton-Sherman Aviation, Inc. Id.
251. Id.
252. ld.
253. ld.
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and heated when it touches upon the subject of liability for the consequences
of tribal action.
Courts and states have developed a strong argument in favor of sovereign
immunity for state actions.2  The same arguments support tribal immunity,
with perhaps even more fervor given tribes' limited financial and legal
resources and their precarious position within the governmental structure of the
United States.274 While states have been able to prosper since the formation
of the Union, the same cannot be said for Indian tribes."n
The situation of Indian tribes has not gone unnoticed. Modem Congresses
have attempted to protect the financial and governmental interests of tribes
through legislation such as the Indian Civil Rights Act."' Meanwhile, the
courts have provided the tribes with a degree of immunity rivaling that
provided to states under the Eleventh Amendment.'
The status of Indian tribes is ever-changing. No one can know where the
doctrine of tribal immunity will go from here. It is possible that a future
Supreme Court - relying upon Seminole - will recognize only a tribal waiver
of immunity, and limit the ability of Congress to impose liability upon the
tribes. This rationale is especially applicable if the Court chooses to expand its
reasoning in Seminole. If the Court is unwilling to recognize pre-Eleventh
Amendment constitutional provisions as bases for congressional abrogation,27
then one must question whether there is any basis for abrogating tribal
immunity when tribes had no part in creating the Constitution.
It is clear from the Court's language in Seminole and Kiowa, however, that
the justices are less than pleased with the doctrine of tribal immunity. Although
one might be able to argue that Seminole's reasoning could be used to justify
a tribe-only waiver of immunity, the Court has repeatedly recognized Congress'
plenary power over tribes.2' After all, Indian tribes had no say in the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, yet by act of Congress the tribes must abide by
its provisions.'
Perhaps even more interesting for the future of tribal immunity, though, is
Kiowa's focus on the doctrine's unstable judicial beginnings. The Kiowa Court
was emphatic in its assertion that tribal immunity was little more than a
273. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
276. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994).
277. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
278. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996) (discussing the
rationale behind allowing section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to serve as a mechanism for
abrogation because it was adopted after the recognition of state sovereign immunity).
279. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Santa Clam Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375
(1886).
280. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994).
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judicial Frankenstein's monster - an interesting theory that once put to
practical use proved unmanageable and damaging to those who confronted
it." Although the Court has to this point been hesitant to smite its creation,
it is clear the justices are losing their patience.
Whatever the outcome, some degree of tribal immunity should be
recognized as a necessary element in promoting the sovereignty and self-
sufficiency of Indian tribes. It would be ironic if the federal government were
willing to expose tribes to suits under a constitutional system the tribes had no
part in making, while failing to expose affluent states to monetary damage suits
for the most egregious of constitutional violations.
281. See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1700, 1703-04
(1998) (discussing the doctrine's unintended creation and its outdated purposes).
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